The 1st Program Built on Transfers: Revisiting the 122.4 Points Record

Offense currently dominates the world of basketball, particularly evident in the NBA where efficiency is exploding. Less known is that college basketball is also experiencing its most efficient season since tracking began in 1997. In light of this trend, it is worth revisiting perhaps the greatest offensive teams ever: Loyola Marymount. The program was ahead of its time, being the first to substantially build its roster with Division 1 transfers. Given the current explosion of offense we will explore the likelihood of such a feat ever being replicated.

The First Program Built With Transfers

While there were a few notable examples of transfers before the 1990s, they were not prominent. Only Kyle Macy transferring from Purdue to Kentucky makes most top transfer of all time list. However, no program certainly had truly built its foundation on transfers until Loyola Marymount emerged. Not only were they pioneers in offensive, but they were also the first program to construct a high level core of a primarily through multiple Division I transfers.

Everyone knows about Hank Gathers and Bo Kimble transfer from USC, but there was also Corey Gaines from UCLA who played in the NBA as well as Chris Nikchevich and Vic Lazzaretti from BYU and Marquette. These weren’t just deep bench warmers either. All were rotation players and averaged at least 6ppg. Bo Kimble was a All Pac 12 Freshman averaging 12.1ppg at USC. This was a program with legitimate NBA and major conference talent over these years.

122.4 PPG

Loyola Marymount set the all-time college basketball scoring record of 122.4 ppg, achieved during an era when the shot clock was set at 35 seconds. Despite this constraint, the game closely resembled the modern game of today, featuring a three-point shot that, and that was utilized at a decent rate. Additionally, the NCAA tournament had expanded to 64 teams by then.

To contextualize this achievement, consider that the 1981-82 Denver Nuggets hold the NBA’s all-time scoring record with an average of 126.5 points per game. In comparison, this season, the Indiana Pacers are averaging 123.1 points per game, ranking seventh all-time in NBA history. Remarkably, Loyola Marymount’s average of 122.4 points per game would place them tenth all-time in NBA history, despite playing eight fewer minutes per game in college and operating with a shot clock that was 11 seconds longer.

Their prolific pace was exceptional but it wasn’t just pace. While they may not be the most efficient team ever (with a True Shooting percentage of .603), they were highly effective. In fact, their efficiency level would still place them 5th this season and 2nd last season in true shooting. For comparison even in this hyper efficient offensive season Alabama leads the NCAA at 90ppg.

This wasn’t merely a team that ran up and down the court or a team putting up empty stats on bad teams in some low major conference. LMU finished 15th and 21st in the AP Poll in 1988 and 1990 while going 4-3 in the NCAA Tournament. They had 5 NBA players on the roster over the 5 years and were involved in all 5 of the top highest scoring games in NCAA history.

Influence

Shortly after LMU’s success Troy State would set the D2 scoring record at 121ppg two seasons prior to moving up to D1 in 1994. This dynamic, high-octane offense mirrored the style adopted by LMU. So dedicated was Don Maestri to emulating their strategies that he procured game tapes from Loyola Marymount, studying their plays and methods meticulously.

Maestri’s strategic approach involved an unabashed pursuit of steals on every opponent possession, with a willingness to allow quick scores if the steal attempt failed. Employing regular player substitutions, Maestri relied on a relentless, fast-paced style of play to exhaust opposing teams just as LMU had.

Inspired by Westheads Style of play Maestri would be part of the highest scoring college basketball game ever winning 258-141 over DeVry.

The “System” Stalls

It is noteworthy that Maestri entered Division 1 two seasons later averaging 98 points per game in the inaugural year. Despite this promising start, heshift away from the fast-paced coaching style within a few seasons. After averaging 92+ points per game in each of the initial three seasons in D1. He eventually adapted to a conventional-paced offense, typically landing in the low to mid-70 ppg range. Surprisingly, with this adjustment, he found increased success and remained at Troy 20 years.

Denver and George Mason

Westhead failed to replicate his earlier success in the men’s game following his departure from LMU. Despite having clinched an NBA Championship as the Lakers’ head coach in 1980, his tenure was marred by conflicts with Magic Johnson, ultimately resulting in his dismissal. Upon returning to the NBA, Westhead’s Denver the team allowed an average of 130.8 points per game, marking an all-time record of futility.

Following his two-year tenure with the Nuggets, Westhead transitioned to George Mason, where his up-tempo style also faltered, resulting in a disappointing record of 38-70. Towards the end of his time at George Mason, Westhead notably even adjusted his pace significantly in an attempt to salvage his job.

Conclusion

Could This Ever Work Again

VMI stands out as the sole program in this century to have achieved an average of 100 points per game in a season at 100.9ppg. However, their accomplishment it occurred just once in 2006-07 during a 14-19 season in a low major conference, despite boasting an upperclassmen future NBA player on their roster and playing a schedule ranked 265th.

While it remains within the realm of possibility for another low-major school might adopt a similarly aggressive scoring strategy, but I don’t think there will ever be a similar mix of raw points and with high level efficiency. At least not with the same level of NBA talent and NCAA and top 25 success unless it’s at a Blue Blood program. This doesn’t seem like a winning philosophy for a non power program.

Why

I believe coaches have become more astute, and numerous examples suggest that maintaining that level of pace is unsustainable for maximizing talent is counterproductive. Efficiency appears to take precedence, with an emphasis on conserving energy for execution and showing patience and moving the ball are the way to go. There’s little justification for relentless up and down the court just to get shots up quick when a smarter approach could suffice. This rings particularly true for lower-tier programs attempting to compete with less skilled players and limit possessions and how deep they have to go into their bench.

There could however potentially arise a scenario in which a program akin to Kentucky, boasting a roster abundant with ten high-caliber NBA or experienced transfer players, employs a strategy of overwhelming opponents with pace. The aim might be to amass a considerable number of possessions, leveraging the presence of top-tier talent and more chance to win out or from the bench to exhaust opposing teams.

Evidence

It seems that even the pioneers of the style, such as Westhead and Maestri, experienced diminishing returns by the late 90s, as evidenced by their slower pace during their coaching stints at Troy and George Mason. While there have been similar aggressive, albeit lower-scoring, examples that have emerged since, such as Jim Crunchfield’s 100+ scoring teams in D2, Duggar Boucum’s VMI team – the only D1 team to achieve 100ppg since – and even the Grinnell teams in D3, none have come close to replicating LMU’s success at lower levels.

All in all, I think it’s a system that has proven to yield diminishing returns. It sounds good in theory to run, run, run, but you need players. Perhaps the most impressive aspect of LMU was their stamina and the fact that players could play at that pace and still average as many as 34 minutes a game or play as few as a 7-man rotation. The difference, I believe, today is that you have to guard more distance with the threes taken.

The Final Verdict

It would likely be more demanding and require a deeper bench, we suspect. A deeper bench implies a greater need for talent, which in turn makes it more challenging to execute such a strategy effectively. Essentially, you’re substituting minutes from your top two or three players with those of your 8th, 9th, or 10th players, which, irrespective of the team, can be detrimental. It’s not efficient to replace an All American who is slightly fatigued with a 10th man when you could just play slower and get 35 solid minutes a game out of him. This is why I believe we seldom see teams attempting this approach anymore, and those that do, typically resemble teams such as Kentucky or a Pitino like coached team of old, where there’s a significant accumulation of talent, making the strategy and pressing more viable. Even LMU needed two All Americans and multiple NBA players to succeed with this system.